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Choosing Intellectual 
Protection: 
Imitation, Patent Strength 
and Licensing
  David ENCAOUA* and Yassine LEFOUILI**12
ABSTRACT. – Patents are probabilistic rights. We set up a multi-stage 
model in which choosing between patent and trade secrecy is affected by three 
parameters : the patent strength defined as the probability that the right is upheld 
by the court, the cost of imitating a patented innovation relative to the cost of 
imitating a secret innovation, and the innovation size defined as the magnitude of 
the cost reduction. the choice of the protection regime is the result of two effects: 
the damage effect evaluated under the unjust enrichment doctrine and the effect 
of market competition that occurs under the shadow of infringement. We find that 
large innovations are likely to be kept secret whereas small innovations are always 
patented. Furthermore, medium innovations are patented only when patent strength 
is sufficiently high. Finally, we investigate a class of patent licensing agreements 
used to settle patent disputes between patent holders and their competitors.
Choix de la protection intellectuelle : imitation, force des 
brevets et licences
RÉSUMÉ. – les brevets sont des droits de propriété probabilistes. le choix 
entre brevet et secret est affecté par trois paramètres: la probabilité que le tribunal 
confirme le droit accordé par l’office des brevets à l’innovateur, le coût d’imiter une 
innovation brevetée relativement à celui d’imiter une innovation secrète, et la taille 
de l’innovation définie comme l’importance de la réduction de coût. le choix du 
régime de protection est le résultat de deux effets: l’effet dommages évalué selon 
la doctrine de l’enrichissement indû et l’effet de la concurrence sous la menace 
d’une infraction. il s’avère que les innovations de plus grande taille ont tendance 
à être tenues secrètes alors que les innovations de plus petite taille sont toujours 
brevetées. les innovations intermédiaires ne sont brevetées que si la probabilité 
d’invalidation est suffisamment faible. enfin, nous nous intéressons à une classe 
de licences utilisées dans le cadre d’accords à l’amiable entre les détenteurs de 
brevets et leurs concurrents.
* d. encaoua: university of Paris 1 Panthéon-sorbonne, ces; e-mail: encaoua@univ-
paris1.fr
** Y. lefouili: university of Paris 1 Panthéon sorbonne, ces; e-mail: yassine.lefouili@
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1  Introduction
The traditional view that firms always prefer patents to other forms of protection 
for their innovations has been empirically challenged for a long time. It is now 
well known that trade secrecy, first mover advantage and exploitation of lead time 
may be preferred forms of protection, at least in some industries. Even in the same 
industry, forms of protection may differ according to the nature and importance 
of the innovation and to the disclosure effect. Early studies by Scherer [1965, 
1967, 1983] have shown that the propensity to patent varies significantly accross 
industries and that interindustrial variations in patenting activity are not explai-
ned by R&D expenditures. PakeS and GrilicheS [1980] were among the first to 
find that the degree of randomness in the patenting activity within industries was 
not explained by R&D variations. They have shown that the residual patenting 
behaviour was explained by the potential imitation allowed by the disclosed infor-
mation and by the innovator’s capability to appropriate the rents generated by the 
innovation. ManSfield [1986] obtained similar results based on a survey where 
US manufacturing firms were asked what fractions of inventions they would not 
have developed in the absence of patents between 1980 and 1983. These fractions 
were very low in many industries (less than 10% in electrical equipment, primary 
metals, instruments, motor vehicles and others) and relatively high in industries 
like pharmaceuticals (60%) and chemicals (40%). Two more recent surveys (Yale 
Survey by levin et al., 1987 and Carnegie Mellon Survey by cohen et al. [2000]) 
confirm these trends: it is only in industries where knowledge is strongly codified 
that patents appear to be substantially preferred to other forms of protection.
Despite this accumulated empirical evidence, theoretical explanations of why 
and when an innovator would prefer to keep an innovation secret rather than to 
patent it remain rather scarce. Before turning to the related literature, note that even 
if patenting is not considered as the best form of protection, innovators have a lot of 
reasons to apply for patents serving purposes different from protection (hall and 
ZiedoniS, [2001], encaoua et al. [2005]). This feature complicates the problem. 
Indeed, a theoretical explanation of why and when patenting is not the best form of 
protection must also be compatible with the more cumbersome issue of why, des-
pite the existence of preferred forms of protection, patents remain so widespread 
(ScotchMer, [2004]).
At least three types of theoretical arguments are required to explain the protec-
tion choice.
First, patents must be recognized as not being ironclad property rights but rather 
probabilistic rights. If patents offered perfect protection against any imitation, 
there would be no doubt about the best protection regime. leMley and ShaPiro 
[2005] qualify the uncertain intellectual property rights in a suggestive way: «A 
patent does not confer upon its owner the right to exclude a potential imitator but 
rather a right to try to exclude by asserting the patent in court. When a patent hol-
der asserts its patent against an alleged infringer, the patent holder is rolling the 
dice. If the patent is found invalid, the property right will have evaporated». Thus, 
patent strength refers to the probability to recover damages, with the consequence 
that only strong patents give in principle to the patent holder the right to exclude 
an infringer or to force him to buy a license. But as we argue below, even holders 
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of weak patents may escape the uncertain litigation process. They succeed through 
their licensing strategies to capture a significant part of the consumer’s surplus. 
This is why the notion of patent quality enters so forcefully in the agenda of anti-
trust authorities nowadays, especially through criticism of the examination system 
of the patent office (MerGeS, 1999, leMley, [2001]).
Second, the traditional view that knowledge is a blueprint has also been challen-
ged. Replicating an existing invention may be costly and time consuming because 
knowledge is more or less embedded in individuals and firms rather than in phy-
sical products or equipment. one has to distinguish innovations according to their 
secrecy effectiveness, which is the main determinant of the imitation cost (anton 
et al. [2006]). Many innovations involve hidden know-how even if the allowed 
performance is perfectly observable. Consider for instance a process innovation 
leading to a cost reduction that is reflected back in the market price but for which 
the technological knowledge is neither perfectly revealed nor easily reverse-engi-
neered. In this case, imitating the process innovation or building around it may be 
rather costly. Moreover, the imitation cost may depend on whether the invention 
has been patented or not. As the patent discloses some enabling technological infor-
mation, it is clear that imitating a patented innovation should be at most as costly as 
if it was kept secret. our paper offers a natural framework to analyze the classical 
tradeoff between getting a legal protection involving a compulsory disclosure of 
enabling information and keeping secrecy by giving up legal protection.
Third, even if patents do not always appear as the best form of protection, inno-
vators may nevertheless prefer to patent their innovations because holding a patent 
offers the possibility to settle a dispute against an alleged infringer through a 
licensing agreement (farrell and ShaPiro, [2005], leMley and ShaPiro, [2005]). 
Alleged infringers may also prefer to avoid a litigation process not only because 
litigation is costly but also because winning the lawsuit against the patent holder 
involves a free-riding aspect, as other competitors benefit from the asserted patent’s 
invalidity. Therefore, even when they are weak, patents generate substantial reve-
nues through licensing royalties that may harm consumers. This is why patent sett-
lements raise serious concerns for competition policy authorities (ShaPiro, [2003], 
encaoua and hollander, [2004]).
The main objective of this paper is to introduce these arguments in a simple 
model allowing a discussion of the following issues:
i/ What are the different forces that interact in the choice of a protection regime 
(patent or secrecy)? 
ii/ how are these forces affected by the patent strength, imitation cost and inno-
vation size?
iii/ What sort of licensing agreements are likely to emerge in order to avoid 
patent litigation?
Two main contributions have explicitly explored the decision whether to patent 
an innovation or not.1 hortSMan et al. [1985] assume that an innovating firm pos-
1 Among other papers related to the choice of an intellectual property regime, one can include craMPeS 
[1986], Gallini [1992] and ScotchMer and Greene [1990]. Crampes examines the tradeoff between 
keeping secret an invention during an indefinite time or obtaining a legal protection over a finite 
duration (the statutory patent life). gallini introduces the idea that breadth governs the cost of inven-
ting around the patent. however, it is entry cost rather than imitation cost that matters. ScotchMer 
and Greene [1990] focuses on the impact of patent policy on the incentives to innovate. Their model 
involves a binary choice as the innovation would not be realized if it were not patented. They also 
assume full disclosure of technological know-how.
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sesses private information about profits available to competitors and that patent 
coverage may not exclude profitable imitation. Conceived as an information trans-
fer mechanism, a patent that covers full information is not optimal. The optimal 
innovator’s choice is a mixed strategy between patenting and keeping secrecy 
while the follower’s optimal choice is to stay out of the market when the innovator 
patents and to imitate when the innovator does not. The peculiarities of this model, 
in terms of the signaling aspect of the patent and the a priori restrictions put on the 
follower’s action, explain why imitation of a patented innovation does not occur in 
equilibrium. Since our paper is close to anton and yao [2004], we describe more 
thoroughly their framework. Starting from the premise that disclosure provides 
competitors with usable information and focusing on the innovator’s decision about 
how much of an innovation should be disclosed, their model is particularly relevant 
for a special type of secrecy effectiveness. They describe a situation where the real 
innovation performance is not directly observable while the disclosed know-how 
enables a competitor to costlessly replicate it. Therefore, by choosing the amount to 
be disclosed, the innovator directly controls the behaviour of the potential imitator. 
Their model is a signaling game where the innovator has private information on the 
innovation size and decides to reveal partially or fully this information, letting the 
potential imitator infer the leader’s advance. The follower chooses either to imitate 
or not under the risk of infringement. A refined perfect bayesian equilibrium of the 
signaling game involves a separating strategy in which: i/ small innovations are 
patented and fully disclosed; ii/ medium innovations are patented and partially dis-
closed; iii/ large innovations are kept secret and partially disclosed through a public 
announcement. This result is illustrated by their suggestive title: «little patents and 
big secrets».
In our model, we maintain the general tradeoff to which an innovator is confron-
ted when choosing the protection regime. however, rather than focusing on the 
signaling aspect we assume that: i/ the process innovation size, measured by the 
cost reduction, is directly observable; ii/ a patent reveals technological information 
that lowers the imitation cost relatively to the situation where the innovation is 
kept secret.2 Choosing to patent may expose the innovator either to an increased 
imitation level or to a lower one because the imitation level does not only depend 
on the imitation cost but also on two other crucial parameters: the innovation size 
and patent strength. It may happen that an innovator benefits from being imitated : 
this occurs whenever the incurred loss due to imitation is overcompensated by the 
damages it receives from an imitator if the court upholds the patent validity and 
the patent infringement. If patenting or keeping secret the process innovation are 
leading to the same imitation level, then patenting will be preferred since damages 
are expected under the patent regime. This corresponds to the damage effect. But as 
soon as imitation levels differ according to the protection regime, a conflict arises 
as long as imitation becomes higher under the patent regime. This corresponds to 
the competition effect. Therefore, as soon as the imitation extent is decided by the 
follower, different interactions may occur between the competition effect and the 
damage effect. our paper aims to clarify these interactions. We propose a complete 
information multistage game in which three common knowledge parameters are 
2 If the reduction of the imitation cost directly depends on the disclosed level of enabling knowledge, 
using a relative imitation cost parameter is equivalent to using a disclosure level. It appears howe-
ver that working with the relative imitation cost parameter is more convenient since the extent of 
imitation remains controlled by the imitator, while the choice of a protection regime is made by the 
innovator.
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crucial: the innovation size, the patent strength and the relative cost of imitation. 
We depart from the assumption limiting a priori an imitator’s behaviour by letting 
it choose its own cost reduction in response to the process innovation. We also spe-
cify that expected damages paid by the potential infringer correspond to the infrin-
ger’s profit, the risk of infringement being directly linked to the patent strength. 
our damages specification only presents a slight difference with the infringer’s 
revenue retained in anton and yao [2004].3 Thus our results may be compared to 
the «little patents and big secrets» results in Anton and Yao.
The main results of our approach are as follows. For a given innovation size, 
patent strength and relative cost of imitation generally act as strategic substitutes. 
An increase of one of these parameters must be compensated by a decrease of the 
other in oder to keep the same value of the innovator’s profit. Inventors of small 
process innovations always prefer patent protection to trade secrecy. This reminder 
of the «little patents» result by anton and yao [2004] rests however on a different 
argument in our model. For large process innovations, our results present some 
difference with the « big secrets» characterization in Anton and Yao. our model 
does not totally discard the possibility of patenting some large process innovations, 
whenever imitation is too costly. This may happen when information is poorly 
disclosed in the patent. In this case the innovator is indifferent between secret and 
patent. For medium process innovations, our results differ more significantly from 
those of Anton and Yao. It is not optimal for a firm producing such an innovation to 
file a patent of bad quality, that is a patent having a low probability to be upheld by 
the court, unless the disclosed information does not significantly lower the imita-
tion cost. We show that there exists a safe protection level that is sufficient to deter 
any imitation and that this level is lower than a 100% protection. As the innovation 
size decreases, trade secrecy is less likely. Finally, the «one size fits all» principle 
in the patent design is not validated by our analysis.
These results raise many practical issues. While the model predicts that it is sel-
dom optimal for a firm to file a patent when the probability that it will be upheld 
by the court is low, bad quality patents (relatively to novelty and non-obviousness 
requirements) are widespread in real word. how can this be explained? Moreover, 
why bad quality patents are not litigated more often than we do observe? These 
issues are at the heart of what has been called the patent paradox (hall and 
ZiedoniS, 2001, ScotchMer, [2004]). We devote a brief analysis that suggests a 
possible answer to explain this paradox. Whenever a patent is not conceived only 
as a protection against imitation but also as a tool to reach private settlements 
through licensing agreements (ShaPiro, [2003]), licensing agreements may act as 
an alternative to patent litigation. A royalty rate independent of the patent strength 
combined to a specific fixed fee may serve this purpose.
The model is presented in section 2. The market competition outcome under the 
shadow of infringement is described in section 3. The imitator’s behaviour is analy-
zed in section 4. The core of the paper, which corresponds to the protection regime 
choice is examined in section 5. We devote section 6 to licensing agreements. our 
conclusions are presented in section 7.
3 In a more recent paper, anton and yao [2005] introduce the «lost» profits of the patentee, defined as 
the profits that would have occured in the absence of infringement. They show that at equilibrium, 
infringement may take one of two forms: a «passive» form in which lost profits of the patentee are 
zero and an «aggressive» form where they are positive. one of the main results in anton and yao 
[2005] is that infringement always occurs when damages equal lost profits. This latter result does not 
hold in our model.
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2  The basic set-up
We examine a process innovation in a framework involving two competing 
firms. We suppose that firm 1 is an innovating firm and firm 2 is a possible imitator. 
Each firm is risk-neutral and seeks to maximize its expected profit. Initially, both 
firms produce at the same marginal cost c > 0. Fixed production costs are assumed 
to be to zero. We assume that firm 1 undertakes an R&D investment which allows 
to reduce the marginal cost to the level d1 < c. The game we study hereafter starts 
once the innovation is introduced and involves three stages.
First, in the protection stage, the innovator has to choose between two protection 
regimes. The first regime, which we denote by p, is to patent its innovation, and the 
second regime, which we denote by S, consists in protecting its innovation by the 
means of trade secrecy.
Second, in the imitation stage, after the observation of the innovator’s marginal 
cost d1, firm 2 chooses to imitate (or “build around”) the innovator’s technology. 
It imitates the innovation by transforming its old technology into a follow-up tech-
nology which allows it to reduce its marginal cost to  note that we do 
not allow the imitator to improve the innovator’s technology. The difference c – d2 
represents the «extent of imitation». When d2 = c, there is no imitation at all and 
when d2 = d1, imitation is full. We assume that imitation at a level  indu-
ces a fixed imitation cost I(d2) which depends on whether the innovation is patented 
or kept secret. precisely, we assume that the imitation cost under the patent regime, 
which we denote by IP(d2), and the imitation cost under the secrecy regime, which 
we denote by IS(d2) , satisfy the following condition :
 
where the parameter f ≥ 0 measures the relative costs of imitation under the regi-
mes p and S. We assume that f ≤ 1 : since patenting involves a compulsory disclo-
sure, it is likely that imitating a patented innovation turns out to be less costly than 
imitating a secret innovation.
Third, in the competition stage, market outcomes are determined under the sha-
dow of punishment. We assume that, when the innovation is patented, firm 1 sues 
firm 2 for infringement if firm 2 chooses a follow-up technology that allows to pro-
duce at a marginal cost d2 < c. We also assume that firm 2 systematically contests 
the validity of the patent covering the innovation. We denote by e the probability 
that an imitation infringes the innovator’s patent. This probability can be interpre-
ted as an indicator of the lagging patent’s breadth : the broader the patent’s breadth, 
the higher the probability that a follow-up technology that reduces the marginal 
cost c to  is an infringement of the patent on the process innovation d1. 
We denote by g the probability that the patent survives the imitator’s legal contesta-
tion of the patent’s validity. We interpret this parameter as the patent’s quality: low 
quality patents have higher chances to be invalidated by a court than high quality 
patents. Thus, a higher quality patent (in terms of novelty and inventiveness) is 
less uncertain in the sense that the probability that a court will uphold its validity 
is higher. Firm 2 is compelled to pay damages, supposed to be equal to its market 
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profit, if and only if the patent is held valid and the imitation infringes the pat-
ent. This occurs with probability θ = eg (we assume that the issues of validity and 
infringement are independent). The parameter  corresponds to what is cal-
led the patent strength. When the innovation is not patented, no damages are paid.
Following anton and yao [2004], we model our duopoly market competition as 
a traditional Cournot competition (quantity setting) with linear market demand: 
 
where x1 is the output of firm , x2 is the output of firm  and p(x1 + x2) is the 
market clearing price.
We assume that c < a < 2c. The first inequality is usual and means that the margi-
nal cost before innovation is below the choke price. The second inequality expres-
ses that the market is small which is a likely scenario for innovative markets, as it 
allows the possibility that the innovative firm becomes at least twice as efficient as 
it currently is4. In other words, the inequality a < 2c implies that there exist innova-
tions d1 such that d1 < 2c – a, which can also be written as a – d1 > 2(a – c).
We choose a convex specification for the imitation technology and, to reach ana-
lytical results, we use a quadratic expression :
 
3  Competition stage
The competition stage occurs under the shadow of litigation only if the inno-
vation is patented. Therefore, the outcome of the competition stage depends on 
whether the innovation is patented or not.
3.1  Patented innovation
We separately examine the cases d2 < c (the follower imitates the innovator, at 
least partially) and d2 = c (the follower does not imitate the innovator), since the 
profit functions differ in these two cases.
The follower imitates (d2 < c) : Under regime P, the expected gross profits of 
firm 1 and firm 2 are given by:
4 We acknowledge one of the referees for this suggestion.
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and
 
From the expected profits, one derives the Cournot-nash equilibrium outputs 
x1P(d1,d2,θ) and x2P(d1,d2,θ). They correspond either to an interior solution where 
both firms are active : x1P(d1,d2,θ) ≥ x2P(d1,d2,θ) > 0 or to a boundary solution 
where only firm  is active : x1P(d1,d2,θ) > x2P(d1,d2,θ) = 0.
Consider first an interior solution. Routine computations lead to: 
 
 
hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for an interior solution to exist is : 
(1)  
note that this condition is always satisfied when d1 > 2c–a. note also that the 
market price pP(θ) is given by  which is increasing in  
as long as condition (1) is satisfied.
Consider now a boundary solution. Such a solution arises when condition (1) is 
not satisfied and is characterized by: 
 
 
The follower does not imitate (d2 = c) : The equilibrium outputs in this case can 
be derived from those of the previous case by taking θ = 0 and d2 = c. hence:
— If d1 > 2c – a, then the equilibrium outputs are given by:
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— If d1 ≤ 2c – a, then we have the same boundary solution as in the imitation 
case: 
 
 
Summing up all these cases, the expected equilibrium gross profits depend on d1, 
d2 and θ in the following way :
• If d1 ≤ 2c – a then: 
(2)  
(3) 
 
• If d1 > 2c – a then: 
(4)
  
(5) 
 
Therefore, under Cournot competition, firm 2 is driven out of the market if it 
keeps its old technology when the innovation is large enough (d1 < 2c – a) and 
remains active on the market (even without imitating firm 1) when the cost reduc-
tion innovation is small enough (d1 > 2c – a). This result depends on the small mar-
ket assumption (a < 2c). In a large market (a > 2c), firm 2 would remain in the 
market whatever the innovation size. Thus, the small market assumption captures 
the strategic aspect in a richer way, in the sense that the imitator may be driven out 
of the market.
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3.2  Non-patented
Equilibrium outcomes under the trade secrecy regime are derived from those 
under the patent regime by taking θ = 0. This simply means that no damages are 
paid when imitation occurs under secrecy. one obtains :
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
4  Imitation stage
Firm 2 aims to maximize its net profit when it chooses its imitation level 
 Since the follower’s gross profit and imitation cost depend on whether 
the innovation is patented or not, we have to distinguish these two regimes.
4.1  Patented innovation
Under this regime, the imitator’s net profit when it chooses a follow-up techno-
logy allowing to produce at marginal cost  is given by :
 
The follower’s optimal imitation level when the innovation is patented is deter-
mined as:
 
Define  This is a decreasing function of  such that  
and A(1)=0.
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The function  , which is 
the expression of G2P(d1,d2,f,θ) when  and d2 < c, is necessarily either 
convex or concave over its whole definition domain. The following preliminary 
results are easy to show:
1 - The function   is stricly convex if f < 8A(θ) and is strictly 
concave if f > 8A(θ).
2 - The unconstrained extremum of  is easily obtained by 
the the FoC:
(8) 
 
In order to obtain the value of d2P(d1,f,θ), it is necessary to know whether 
H(d1,d2,f,θ) is convex or concave and to compare d2int(d1,f,θ) to d1 and c. For 
instance, when d1 < 2c – a and f > 8A(θ) (H strictly concave), equation (8) leads 
to d2int(d1,f,θ)>c. Moreover, as g2P(d1,d2,f,θ) is a discontinuous function of d2 for 
d2 = c, it is necessary to compare the value of g2P(d1,c,f,θ) obtained in the absence 
of imitation to the value of  obtained with imitation.
4.1.1  Large innovations (d1 < 2c – a)
With large innovations, partial imitation never occurs. The following proposi-
tion (proof in appendix A1) distinguishes two areas in the (θ,f) space according 
to whether the optimal imitation level is maximal (d2P(d1,f,θ) = d1) or minimal 
(d2P(d1,f,θ) = c). In the (θ,f) space, the extent of these two areas depends on d1.
 ProPoSition 1. For large innovations (d1 < 2c – a), there exists a threshold func-
tion  which is decreasing in the patent strength θ and the 
innovation size c – d1 such that :
 — If f < ρ(d1,θ), then the follower fully imitates: d2P(d1,f,θ) = d1.
 — If f > ρ(d1,θ), then the follower does not imitate d2P(d1,f,θ) = c and is driven 
out of the market.
The interpretation of this proposition, illustrated in figure 1, is clear. When the 
process innovation is large enough (d1 < 2c – a), there exists a threshold imita-
tion cost ρ(d1, θ) such that if f is below this threshold it is optimal for a follower 
to fully imitate the patented innovation (d2P(d1,f,θ) = d1), whereas if f is above 
the threshold, it does not pay to imitate. note that  for any 
d1 < 2c – a. Therefore, sufficiently large patented innovations, even if they are pro-
tected with a weak patent (θ not far from 0), will not be imitated as long as the 
imitation cost parameter f is sufficiently high ( ). This result means that for 
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a sufficiently high lead advance of the innovator and a sufficiently high imitation 
cost, imitation of the patented innovation never occurs and the technological fol-
lower is driven out of the market. This result, which occurs under a low intensity 
of competition in the product market (Cournot) is also true for a higher intensity of 
competition. 5 Another important result is that the threshold imitation cost ρ(d1, θ) 
decreases as the patent is stronger (higher θ) and as the innovation is larger (lower 
d1). The patent strength θ and the imitation cost parameter f act as strategic subs-
titutes, because both f and θ include a cost dimension for the imitator, directly via 
f and indirectly via θ. As θ increases, the expected damages paid by the infringer 
increase and correspond to a higher cost of infringement. Therefore an increase of 
one of these cost parameters must be compensated by a decrease of the other in 
order to keep the same expected profits of the imitator.
fiG. 1 : imitation of large innovations (d1 < 2c – a)
4.1.2. Small and medium innovations (d1 > 2c – a)
This case is more complicated to analyze. partial imitation is no more discarded. 
Indeed, three situations, namely full imitation, partial imitation and no imitation, 
may occur according to the values of the parameters (d1,f,θ). The following pro-
position (proof in appendix A2) summarizes the follower’s optimal strategy accor-
ding to the values of the parameters f, θ and d1 when d1 > 2c – a.
5 It is different from the result obtained in anton and yao [2005] according to which imitation always 
occurs under the lost profit damages
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 ProPoSition 2. Consider small and medium innovations (d1 > 2c – a). For each 
value of d1, there exist three separating functions in the (θ,f) space defined by 
,  and  
that delineate three regions:
 — If (f,θ,d1) satisfy f < Min(α(d1,θ),β(d1,θ)), then the follower fully imitates: 
d2P(f,θ,d1)= d1
 — If (f,θ,d1) satisfy α(d1,θ) < f < γ(θ), then the follower partially imitates: d2P(d1, 
f,θ)= d2int(d1,f,θ)
 — If (f,θ,d1) satisfy β(d1,θ) < f < α(d1,θ) or f > Max(α(d1,θ),γ(θ)), then the fol-
lower does not imitate: d2P(f,θ,d1)= c.
 The functions α(d1,θ) and β(d1,θ) are decreasing in the patent strength θ and in the 
innovation size c – d1 and γ(θ) is decreasing in the patent strength θ. Moreover 
the equations in θ given by α(d1,θ) = β(d1,θ) and α(d1,θ) = γ(θ) have the same 
solution   which means that the curves f = α(d1,θ), f = β(d1,θ) and 
f = γ(θ) meet at a same point θ0(d1) in the ( θ,f ) space for a given d1 > 2c – a.
fiG. 2 : imitation of medium innovations 
This proposition is illustrated in figure 2 in which we assume  
It follows from  that  Therefore it is 
worth distinguishing medium innovations  from small inno-
vations (d1 > 2c – a). 
The imitator’s choice of d2 is affected by three variables: the cost parameter f, the 
patent strength θ and the innovation size c – d1. Define θγ and θβ(d1) as the solu-
tions of the respective equations: γ(θ) = 1 and β(d1,θ) = 0. For a given innovation 
d1 such that d1 > 2c – a, the effect of the cost imitation parameter f on the imitation 
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level d2 depends on the value of the patent strength θ in [0,1] in a specific way that 
we now describe.
When θ < θγ, the patent is very weak and imitation occurs whatever the cost imi-
tation parameter f for two reasons. First, the risk of infringing a very weak patent 
is not sufficiently dissuasive: even if an infringement lawsuit occurs, damages will 
be paid with a very low probability θ. Second, imitation is not expensive enough to 
deter imitation of a small or medium innovation (d1 > 2c – a). Therefore, imitation 
is either partial or full according to the imitation cost f. It is only partial if f is above 
the threshold α(d1,θ) and it is full if f is below this threshold.
When θγ ≤ θ ≤ θ0(d1), the patent is stronger and imitation becomes more expen-
sive since the payment of damages occurs with a higher probability θ. Therefore, 
imitation may be either absent, partial or full, according to the imitation cost para-
meter value f. There is no imitation at all when f is higher than γ(θ). Imitation is 
only partial when f is below γ(θ) and above the previous threhold α(d1,θ) and is full 
when f is lower than α(d1,θ).
A third situation occurs when θ0(d1) ≤ θ ≤ θβ(d1). In this case, infringing is much 
more expensive because the patent will be upheld by the court with a higher pro-
bability θ. however, keeping the old technology d2 = c is also very detrimental for 
the follower. Therefore, imitation is either full or absent according to whether f is 
below or above the lower threshold β(d1,θ). 
Finally, a fourth situation occurs for the highest values of θ (θ > θβ(d1)). In this 
case, it is no more profitable to imitate even when imitation is costless, because the 
patent protection is very strong. The imitation cost does not matter anymore and 
the presumptions that the patent will be upheld by the court and that imitation will 
be judged as being an infringement are so high that the patent protection entirely 
plays its role against imitation. Since θβ(d1) < 1, it is interesting to note that less 
than perfect protection is sufficient to deter imitation. Therefore, it is justified to 
refer to the value θβ(d1) as the safe protection level. A patent that protects against 
imitation does not need to be 100% perfect and the safe protection level depends 
on the importance of the innovation itself. As the innovation is less important (d1 
increases), the safe protection level θβ(d1) increases. This important result suggests 
that smaller innovations require stronger protection, since they are likely to be 
imitated. This is a serious argument against the «one size fits all» protection prin-
ciple.
The effect of d1 over d2P(f,θ,d1) for a given (θ,d1) is interesting: as d1 decreases, 
leading to an innovation involving a higher cost reduction, the partial imitation area 
increases because α(d1,θ) decreases, the full imitation area decreases because both 
α(d1,θ) and β(d1,θ) decrease and the no-imitation area increases because β(d1,θ) 
decreases. 
4.1.3  Non-patented innovation
The follower’s optimal imitation strategy under regime S can be simply derived 
from its optimal imitation strategy under regime p by taking f = 1 and θ = 0. The 
next proposition summarizes our findings in the case where the innovator chooses 
to use secrecy to protect its innovation.
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 ProPoSition 3. Under the secrecy regime, the follower’s optimal imitation strat-
egy  is as follows:
 — If d1 ≤ 2c – a then the follower does not imitate (d2S(d1) = c) and is driven out 
of the market.
 — If  then the follower partially imitates (d2S(d1) 
= 9c – 4(a + d1) < d1).
 — If  then the follower fully imitates (d2S(d1) = d1).
note that large innovations (d1 ≤ 2c – a) are never imitated under regime S while 
they are fully imitated under regime p when f < ρ(d1,θ). The explanation of this 
rather unintuitive result simply derives from the previous remark that ρ(d1,θ) < 1 
for any d1 ≤ 2c – a. Then under the patent regime where some enabling knowledge 
is disclosed, the cost imitation parameter f may be so low (more precisely f < ρ(d1,θ) 
for a patent strength θ) that it may be profitable to incur the low imitation cost fI(d1) 
even when damages are paid with a high probability θ.
5  Protection stage
Which protection regime will the innovator choose, once its process innovation 
is achieved? To answer this question, we have to compare its expected profit under 
the patent regime Π1
P(d1,d2P(d1,f,θ),θ) to its expected profits under the secrecy 
regime Π1
S(d1,d2S(d1)), given its anticipation of the follower’s imitation level under 
each one of the two regimes.
let us now determine the forces that drive the innovator’s protection 
regime choice. Consider two imitation levels  . The difference 
Π1
P(d1,d2,θ) – Π1S(d1,d’2) can be decomposed in the following way:
The first term of this decomposition, namely the difference Π1
P(d1,d2,θ) – 
Π1
S(d1,d2), corresponds to what we call the damage effect. given an imitation level 
d2, the innovator can expect some damages if it patents its innovation, which is not 
the case if it chooses to keep it secret. let us show that the damage effect is always 
nonnegative and nondecreasing in θ. This is equivalent to show that the function 
 is nondecreasing for any . For any  
one obtains: 
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When  one can check that this derivative is strictly positive. in 
particular, this leads to : 
 
When , we have shown that Π1
P(d1,d2,θ) does not depend on the para-
meter θ. In particular, Π1
P(d1,d2,θ) = Π1P(d1,d2,0) = Π1S(d1,d2). It follows that 
Π1
P(d1,d2,θ) – Π1S(d1,d2) ≥ 0 for any  and 
Turn now to the second term. The difference Π1
S(d1,d2) – Π1S(d1,d’2) corresponds 
to what we call the competition effect. As the innovator and imitator products are 
substitute, the innovator’s profits decline as it is more imitated : Π1
S(d1,d2) is an 
increasing function of d2, which implies that the sign of Π1S(d1,d2) – Π1S(d1,d’2) is 
the same as the sign of d2 – d’2.
hence, if the innovator anticipates that it will be less (or equally) imitated under 
the patent regime than under the secrecy regime then both the damage effect and the 
competition effect dictate the same protection regime, namely the patent regime. 
But if the innovator anticipates that it will be more imitated under the patent regime 
than under the secrecy regime, then the damage effect and the competition effect 
are opposite. The first pushes the innovator to choose the patent regime while the 
second suggests to choose the secrecy regime. The following lemma, that summa-
rizes and completes what precedes, is useful for the subsequent analysis:
 leMMa 4. If the innovator is less (or equally) imitated under regime P than under 
regime S then its optimal protection regime is the patent regime P. In particular, 
when the innovator anticipates that it will be fully imitated under the secrecy 
regime or that it will not be imitated at all under the patent regime, it always 
chooses to patent its innovation.
In order to determine the innovator’s optimal protection regime, we distinguish 
the three cases that appeared in the imitation stage discussion.
Case 1: d1 < 2c – a (large innovations)
In this case, we know that the innovator is not imitated at all when it chooses to 
keep secrecy (d2S(d1) = c). Its expected profit under regime S is then given by:
 
We have also shown that under the patent regime, the innovator is fully imitated 
or not imitated at all, according to whether f < ρ(d1,θ) or f > ρ(d1,θ). hence, its 
expected profit under regime p is given by:
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implying that : Π1
P(d1,d2P(d1,f,θ))< Π1S(d1,d1) if f < ρ(d1,θ) and Π1P(d1,d2P(d1,f,θ))
< Π1
S(d1,d2S(d1) if f > ρ(d1,θ). 
This leads to the following proposition.
 ProPoSition 5. When the innovation is large enough (d1 < 2c – a) the innovator 
prefers to keep its innovation secret if f < ρ(d1,θ) and is indifferent between pat-
enting and keeping secrecy if f > ρ(d1,θ).
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 3.
fiG. 3: Protection regime for large innovations (d1 < 2c – a)
hence, keeping secrecy is always an optimal strategy for the innovator when 
innovation is large (d1 < 2c – a). Such a choice may hinder diffusion of large inno-
vations. This may be detrimental to society since large innovations are likely to 
be those which bring breakthroughs and open big opportunities for technological 
improvements (cumulative innovation). proposition 5 suggests one way to make 
innovators patent their very inventive innovations: this may be induced either by 
reducing the level of compulsory disclosure which is equivalent, in our model, to 
increasing the value of the parameter f, or by increasing the value of the expected 
damages.
Case 2:  (medium innovations)
In this case, the innovator is partially imitated under regimes. The imitation level 
d2S(d1) is given by proposition 3 and the expected profit under this regime is given 
by:
 
Three subcases must be distinguished according to the value of d2P(d1,f,θ) which 
affects Π1
P(d1,d2P(d1,f,θ)).
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Subcase 2.1: f < Min(α(d1,θ),β(d1,θ))
We know that in this set of parameters, the innovator is fully imitated under 
regime p (d2P(d1)=d1). Its expected profit under regime p is :
 
Some straightforward calculations lead to:
(9)
  
hence the innovator chooses to keep its innovation secret if  and to 
patent it if  note that  is a decreasing function of  
such that  and  
It is interesting to compare this new threshold  to the previously defined 
safe protection level θβ(d1). Since A(θ) is strictly decreasing, the comparison of 
θβ(d1) and  can be derived from the comparison of A(θβ(d1)) and  
From β(d1,θβ(d1)) = 0 we derive:  and, using the above 
expression of , one obtains:  Therefore we 
just need to compare  and 3(3c – a – 2d1). For any  
we have  and 3(3c – a – 2d1) > 3(a – c) and so we get A(θβ(d1)) < 
 which is equivalent to  
This result shows that even if a medium innovation is expected to be fully imi-
tated under the patent regime, a patent protection is still preferred by the innovator 
if the patent holder expects to recover the infringer’s profit with a sufficiently high 
probability. What is important is that this probability  is lower than the safe 
protection level θβ(d1) previously defined. Therefore, patents will be filed even if 
their protection level is strictly lower than the safe protection level warranting per-
fect protection against imitation (see figure 4).
Subcase 2.2 : α(d1,θ) < f < γ(θ)
In this subcase, the innovator is partially imitated under regime p (d2P(d1) = d2int 
(d1,f,θ)) and under regime S (d2S(d1)= 9c – 4(a + d1)< d1). The following lemma 
(proof in appendix A3) compares these imitation levels under regime p and regime S.
 leMMa 6. When the innovator is partially imitated under both protection 
regimes, two cases arise:
 — If f < 9A(θ), then the innovator is more imitated under regime P than under 
regime S
 — If f > 9A(θ), then the innovator is more imitated under regime S than under 
regime P
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Finally, by combining the two previous lemmas, we reach the conclusion that 
when f > 9A(θ), the innovator chooses to patent its innovation since the damage 
effect and the competition effect go in the same direction and dictate the patent 
regime choice. however, if f < 9A(θ) the damage effect and the competition effect are 
opposite. The following lemma is crucial in order to compare Π1
P(d1,d2P(d1,f,θ),θ) 
to Π1
S(d1,d2S(d1)) in this case.
 leMMa 7. Along any curve f = KA(θ) in the (θ,f) space, where K is a strictly 
positive number, the innovator’s profits Π1
P(d1,d2P(d1,f,θ),θ) increase with patent 
strength θ as long as partial imitation occurs.
Proof. We showed in appendix A3 that the follower’s level of imitation d2int(d1,f,θ) 
depends on the parameters θ and f only through  . This implies that d2int(d1,f,θ) 
remains constant as one moves on curve f = KA(θ). Then lemma 7 appears as a 
simple corollary of the result according to which the function  
is increasing, for given marginal costs d1 and d2, This result appeared when we 
introduced the damage effect.
Using this lemma, we derive the following result (proof in appendix A4).
 leMMa 8. For medium innovations   when  α(d1,θ) < f 
< 9A(θ), there exists a threshold λ(d1,θ) decreasing in the patent strength θ such 
that the innovator keeps its innovation secret if f < λ(θ,d1) and  and 
patents it if f > λ(θ,d1) or  The threshlod function λ(d1,θ) satisfies the 
following two conditions : λ(d1,0) = 1 and  
The first condition states that the innovator is indifferent between patenting and 
keeping secrecy when θ = 0 and f = 1 and the second that it is indifferent between 
these two regimes when  and  which is consistent with our 
previous findings (see figure 4).
Subcase 2.3: β(d1,θ) < f < α(d1,θ) or f > Max(α(d1,θ),γ(θ))
In this subcase, the innovator is not imitated at all under the patent regime 
(d2P(d1)=d1) . We derive from lemma 4 that the innovator’s optimal protection 
regime is regime (p).
Finally, the following proposition summarizes the case .
 ProPoSition 9. For medium process innovations  there 
exist a threshold function  decreasing in the innovation size c – d1 and a 
threshold function λ(d1,θ) decreasing in the patent strength θ such that :
 — If  and f < λ(d1,θ) then the innovator chooses the secrecy regime
 — If  or f > λ(d1,θ) then the innovator chooses the patent regime.
This proposition, illustrated in figure 4, can be interpreted as follows. When the 
patent is strong enough  the innovator always chooses to patent its 
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innovation whatever the imitation cost parameter f. This means that the imitation 
cost allowed by disclosure does not matter anymore when the patent strength is 
above . In particular, it patents even if disclosure makes innovation costless. 
This result does not hold for weak patents . In this case, the competi-
tion effect and the damage effect may go in opposite directions leading to different 
protection regimes according to whether the disclosure effect of patenting is high 
enough (f < λ(d1,θ)) or not. The effect of the innovation size on the secrecy region 
is clear: since  decreases as the innovation size decreases (d1 increases), the 
corresponding area shrinks as the innovation is smaller.
fiG. 4: Protection regime for medium innovations  
Case 3:  (small innovations)
In this case, the innovator will be fully imitated if it chooses regime S (d2S(d1) = d1). 
According to lemma , the innovator’s optimal protection regime is the patent 
regime (p).
 ProPoSition 10. Small innovations  are always patented.
This result can be explained in the following way : since small innovations are 
fully imitated under secrecy, patenting is preferred for two reasons : first, it may 
deter imitation leading to higher market profits; second, even when the patent 
strength and the disclosure effect are such that imitation cannot be deterred, it 
allows the innovator to expect some damages compensating its market profits loss 
due to imitation, which is not the case under the secrecy regime.
We develop now an overall discussion of our results by comparing them to those 
of anton and yao [2004] and by embedding them in a broader perspective.
The last proposition states that inventors of small process innovations always pre-
fer protection induced by patent to trade secrecy. This result is a reminder of the 
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«little patents» expression coined by anton and yao [2004]. however, the argument 
behind this common result is different in our model. Under the secrecy regime, small 
process innovations are fully imitated for two reasons that reinforce one another. 
First, imitating a small innovation is not very costly and second, there is no threat of 
an infringement lawsuit when the innovation is kept secret. Under patent protection, 
such a threat exists and it may overrun the benefits that the infringer expects from 
imitating the leader. note that in our model, small innovations may be imitated under 
the patent regime while this does not occur in Anton and Yao.
For large process innovations, our results are similar to the «big secrets» characteri-
zation obtained in Anton and Yao. large process innovations are never imitated when 
they are kept secret, while the enabling knowledge disclosed by a patent may reduce 
the imitation cost in a way that makes their imitation attractive. This classical tradeoff 
in the economics of patents explains why «big secrets» are preferred to «big patents». 
note however that our model does not totally discard the possibility of patenting 
some large process innovations. This may occur when their imitation under the patent 
regime is too costly. In this case we have shown that the innovator is indifferent 
between secrecy and patent, because in both cases, the innovation is not imitated.
Finally, it is for medium process innovations that our results significantly differ 
from those of Anton and Yao. We have shown that keeping a medium process inno-
vation secret does not avoid imitation. It is precisely for medium process innova-
tions that partial innovation occurs under the secrecy regime. however, under the 
patent regime, imitation may be either absent, partial and total. We have also shown 
that the innovator may patent or keep secrecy while in Anton and Yao, medium 
process innovations are always patented and partially disclosed.
6  Licensing agreements 
as alternatives to litigation
In this section, we allow licensing agreements between the innovator and the 
follower. Since our purpose is not to study all the possible agreements that may 
emerge, we restrict our attention to the simple case of process innovations leading 
to a small cost reduction, i.e. . When introduced in the market, these 
innovations are always patented, and are fully imitated whenever f is sufficiently 
small (f < Min (a(d1,0) b(d1,0)). We focus on this case and we analyze licensing 
agreements between the innovator and an imitator that avoid litigation to be com-
pleted until the court’s decision.
We study two-part tariff licences (r,F) where r is a royalty rate and F a fixed fee. 
let us first examine the equilibrium outcomes when the innovator and the follower 
agree on a licence (r,F). gross profits can be written as 
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An equilibrium of the competition stage under license regime (l) is given by
 
 
and leads to the following equilibrium price:
 
We assume hereafter that  This assumption does not entail any loss 
of generality since any royalty rate such that  leads to the same boundary 
solution as  : 
 
 
Equilibrium gross profits are given by:
(10)  
(11) 
6.1  Benchmark case
First, we address the following question: does there exist a royalty rate r such that 
the profits under licence regime replicate the profits under patent regime without 
licensing:
 
and
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Since we do not set any restriction on the fixed fee F (in particular, we allow F 
to be negative), it is clear that such a question amounts to the existence of a roy-
alty rate r such that the industry profits ΠL(d1,r)= Π1L(d1,r,F)+ Π2L(d1,r,F) under 
the licence regime replicate the industry profits under the patent regime without 
licensing, i.e:
(12)  
This can be rewritten as:
(13)  
Solving this equation, we find a unique solution :
(14)  
The equilibrium price is then given by:
 
The royalty rate  and equilibrium price  are increasing in θ. We can 
now derive the fixed fee  from equation  :
 
Thus, we obtain the following properties of the function 
—  
—  for any  
—  is strictly decreasing over  and strictly increasing over  
note that the licence  not only replicates the expected profits of the 
innovator and the follower under regime P (without licensing) but also induces the 
same equilibrium outputs and then the same equilibrium price. It is indeed easy to 
check that : 
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and
 
which obviously lead to
 
where pP(θ) is the equilibrium price under the patent regime without licensing.
Thus, the fact that competition stage outcomes are identical under both regimes 
(patent under the shadow of infringement and license defined by ), 
allows us to consider the licence regime defined by  as a benchmark 
to which we will compare the outcomes of the licensing agreements that are likely 
to emerge.
6.2  Maximizing the industry profits
one of the agreements which are more likely to emerge is a two-part tariff license 
such that the generated industry profits is maximum among all the joint profits rea-
lized by two-part tariff licenses. The part of the industry profits allocated to each 
firm is then determined by the fixed fee F.
Consider such a licensing agreement, denoted by  Since  is 
defined by , the royalty  does not depend on the 
patent strength θ. Moreover, it is easy to see that  is an increasing func-
tion of  over interval  Then, 
 
leading to the price:
 
This result means that the patent strength is no more reflected by the price paid 
by consumers. In particular, low quality patents which generate lower prices when 
litigated, generate the same maximal price as would do high quality patents. This is 
the main concern raised by licensing agreements that harm consumers.
note that  when  hence, when the follower accepts the 
license  it implicitly accepts to stay out of the market and the industry 
profits are then captured by the patentee. nevertheless, the innovator transfers a 
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part of these monopoly profits to the licensee through the negative fixed fee  
in other words, the license  is equivalent to an agreement where the inno-
vator pays its competitor to stay out of the market. The profits of the patentee and 
the licensee when they agree on the license  are then given by:
 
 
This type of agreement is accepted by both the innovator and the follower as 
long as the fixed fee  is in the interval , that 
is equivalent to:6
(15)  
The possibility that such two-part tariffs involving negative fees emerge in licen-
sing agreements is a big concern for competition authorities. We know that in the 
pharmaceutical industry, agreements of this kind are allowed under the hatch-
Waxman Act and have been actually used by some patents holders in their nego-
ciations with generic challengers. They obviously harm consumers and this is why 
patent settlements, which take the form of licensing agreements, must be under the 
scrutiny of competition authorities (ShaPiro, [2003]).
7  Conclusion
Departing from the usual convention that patents are perfect forms of protection 
opens a lot of research avenues. one of the most important is to know under what 
conditions a patent is preferred to trade secrecy. our model provides a complete 
theoretical answer to this question for a process innovation. For each class of cost 
reduction (small, medium and large) we have obtained specific results. First, we 
have determined the imitation level in each regime. Second, in the space of the 
two key parameters (patent strength and relative imitation cost) we have derived 
6 The licence ( )( )0ˆ,r F θ  where F0(θ) = – A(θ)(5 – θ)(a – d1)2 is the optimal licence, from the innova-
tor’s perspective, among all the licences that maximize industry profits. It is likely to emerge if the 
innovator has a «take it or leave it» bargaining power. Indeed, it is clear that with such a bargaining 
power the innovator will pay its competitor the minimum amount that makes it accept to stay out the 
market.
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the partition that delineates areas where one protection regime dominates the other. 
how can one use these results for a policy purpose? This is an interesting and com-
plex question for which we propose preliminary insights. Consider the relative imi-
tation cost. In a world where patent design is independent of the invention, particu-
larly concerning the same compulsory disclosure for all patents, it seems very hard 
to determine a priori what would be the value of the imitation cost parameter. one 
can simply reach a rather vague idea of the secrecy effectiveness of the invention, 
that leads to an idiosyncratic characterization covering a large spectrum of possibi-
lities, running from the «naked idea» case to the «perfectly hidden idea» case. This 
type of assessment would depend on some priors on whether the invention could 
be more or less easily discovered by reverse-engineering. But in a world where 
a patent is not designed around the «one size fits all» principle, some flexibility 
could be introduced by allowing each innovator to choose a patent inside a menu 
of characteristics. For instance an innovator may have to choose between a patent 
with strong property rights and high disclosure requirements and a patent with 
weak property rights and low disclosure requirements. If an incentive mechanism 
built around this principle could be achieved, it would be an appropriate answer to 
the rather disappointing result according to which «little patents and big secrets» 
are the preferred forms of protection. Small innovations could be easily imitated 
because their rights are weak. large innovations could be patented because their 
rights are strong. In both cases, diffusion of innovation would be enhanced. The 
construction of such an incentive mechanism is the next step in our agenda. 
our model analyzes also the licensing agreements between a patent holder and 
a competitor. Such agreements avoid the litigation to go until completion. one of 
the possible consequences of a patent settlement as an alternative to a trial rai-
ses some concerns. The royalty rate paid by the licensee does not depend on the 
patent strength as a natural benchmark would command. licensing very bad qua-
lity patents may occur with as high royalty rate as if the patent was undoubtful. 
Moreover, the patentee pays a fixed fee to the licensee to compensate its loss in 
the market. While the two parties maximize their joint profits, it is clear that such a 
settlement harms consumers and creates a big concern for society. ShaPiro [2003] 
and farrell and ShaPiro [2005] reach the same conclusion by using quite different 
models.
Finally, while some economists (ayreS and kleMPerer, [1999]) find that proba-
bilistic rights open welfare improving opportunities (entry occurs under the sha-
dow of punishment) it is also important to stress some of their negative conse-
quences. Adopting trade secrecy for large inventions may reduce the diffusion of 
innovations. Moreover, patent settlements of the sort examined in this paper are 
detrimental to society. This is one reason why patent quality is probably one of the 
most challenging issues to which we are now confronted.
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9  Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
Since Π2
P(d1,d2,f,θ) = 0 for any  it follows from the fact that imi-
tation is costly that the follower’s best imitation level over this interval is d2 = c. 
(16)  
which implies that the follower’s optimal imitation level is necessarily equal to 
either c or   
In order to determine the maximum value of g2
P(d1,d2,f,θ) over the interval 
 we must distinguish two cases:
Case 1 : f < 8A(θ)
The function  is convex over  since 
G2
P(d1,d2,f,θ) = H(d1,d2,f,θ) over this interval. Moreover, it is straightforward 
to show that  . Then, there are two possibilities according to 
whether d2int(d1,f,θ) > d1 or d2int(d1,f,θ) ≤ d1.
— If d2int(d1,f,θ) > d1 then  is decreasing over the interval 
 and is increasing over the interval  , which 
entails that  reaches its maximum value over the interval 
 at d2 = d1 or 
— If d2int(d1,f,θ) < d1 then  is increasing over the interval 
 which implies that it reaches its maximum value at d2 = c.
The crucial point is that in both cases,  Since we know 
that the follower prefers not to imitate rather than imitate at a level  , it 
is sufficient to compare g2
P(d1,d1,f,θ) to g2P(d1,c,f,θ) = 0 in order to determine 
d2P(d1,f,θ). hence, two subcases arise:
— If  then G2
P(d1,d1,f,θ) > 0 which results in d2P(d1,f,θ) = d1 
(full imitation)
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— If  then G2
P(d1,d1,f,θ) < 0 which results in 
d2P(d1,f,θ) = c (no imitation).
Case 2 : f > 8A(θ)
In this case,  and  is concave over 
the interval  . Then, the function  is increasing 
over the interval  which results in   
According to (3) , this leads to d2P(d1,f,θ) = c (no imitation). QED
A2. Proof of Proposition 2
The imitator must compare the maximal net profit it can get when it imitates, 
i.e.  , to the net profit it derives from 
keeping its old technology, ie.  Two cases must be dis-
tinguished:
Case 1 : f < 8A(θ) 
In this case,  and  is convex over the 
interval , which entails that  is decreasing over the 
interval  and results in  which has 
to be compared to G2P(d1,c,f,θ)  This leads us to distinguish two subcases.
set  
— If f < β(d1,θ) then G2P(d1,d1,f,θ) > G2P(d1,c,f,θ) which results in d2P(d1,f,θ) = d1 
(full imitation).
— If f > β(d1,θ) then G2P(d1,d1,f,θ) > G2P(d1,c,f,θ) which results in d2P(d1,f,θ) = c 
(no imitation).
Case 2 : f > 8A(θ) 
In this case,  and  is concave over the 
interval  . Two subcases must be distinguished :
— If  then  is decreasing over the interval 
 which implies that  
— If  then  reaches its maximum over 
 at  :  
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Consider the condition  It is straightforward to show that this 
inequality can be rewritten as :
(17)
 
Then, the two previous subcases can be written as:
— If   then  
which has to be compared to G2P(d1,c,f,θ) (this has been previously done).
— If  then  
which has to be compared to G2P(d1,c,f,θ). Comparing these two terms is equiva-
lent to compare f to the threshold . More precisely :
• If  then  which leads to 
 (partial imitation).
• If f > γ(θ) then  which leads to d2P(d1,f,θ) = c 
(no imitation).
let us now show that the equations α(d1,θ) = β(d1,θ) and α(d1,θ) = γ(θ) have 
the same solution θ0(d1) over the interval  which means that the curves 
f = α(d1,θ), f = β(d1,θ) and f = γ(θ) meet at the same point.
Some straightforward computations show that the equation α(d1,θ) = β(d1,θ) is 
equivalent to the equation:
 
Therefore, the equations α(d1,θ) = β(d1,θ) and α(d1,θ) = γ(θ) have the same solu-
tion in θ over the interval  if (and only if)  is a solution of equation 
. It is easy to check that this is satisfied. QED
A3. Proof of lemma 6.
It is easy to see that d2int(d1,f,θ) depends on the parameters ( f,θ ) only through 
the parameter  With a slight modification of notations, we can write 
 It is also clear that the imitation level d2int is increas-
ing in . hence, lemma 6 simply derives from 
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A4. Proof of lemma 8.
Consider first the case  let us show that the equation 
 which expresses that the inno-
vator is indifferent between patenting and keeping secrecy (in this subcase) has 
a unique solution in f over the interval  . Since the function 
  is strictly increasing over the interval  , this 
is equivalent to state that equation  has a 
unique solution in d2 over the interval . 
The latter interval can simply be written as  note that function 
 is a convex parabolic func-
tion then it is either i/ increasing over  or ii/ U-shaped over 
 Since , we have Fθ(d1) < 0 (see subcase 2.1). We also 
know from lemma  that F(9c – 4a – 4d1 ) ≥ 0. It follows that in both cases i/ and 
ii/ the equation Fθ(d2) = 0 has a unique solution over  hence, the 
equation  has a unique solution in f 
that we denote by λ(d1,θ). note that  which 
leads to λ(d1,1) = 0. note also that :
(18) 
Furthermore, we know that  and 
  (see subcase ) so  
 which leads to 
Consider now the case  let  and  
The point (θ0,f0) belongs to the curve  It is easy to see (graphi-
cally or analytically) that the curve  necessarily meets either the 
curve defined by  and f ≤ α(d1,θ) or the curve defined by f = λ(d1,θ) and 
 at a point (θ1,f1) such that θ1 < θ0. Since in any point of the latter two 
curves the innovator’s profit under regime p is equal to its profit under regime S, 
and θ1 < θ0, we derive from lemma  that the innovator’s profit under regime P 
is greater than its profit under regime S when (θ,f) = (θ0,f0). hence, the innovator 
chooses to patent its innovation.
let us now show that λ(d1,θ) is strictly decreasing in θ. Consider θ1 and 
θ2 such that  The points (θ1,d1) and  
belong to the curve defined by . We derive from lemma  
that  
 which leads, according to (19), to  
Furthermore we know that A(θ) is positive and decreasing, so  This allows 
us to state that λ(d1,θ1) > λ(d1,θ2). QED.

